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Introduction.  
The aim of this article is to use probabilistic ideas to study predictive reasoning based on 
hypotheses and models, but without using Ito calculus, without writing any stochastic 
differential equations, in fact without writing any formulas at all. The aim is to extract from the 
study of stochastic processes those qualitative traits that have significant philosophical 
implications for the political decision-making process. 
Indeed, we need to acknowledge that the impact of the economy on the environment is 
not a result of temperance or mitigation of natural variations but rather that the economy itself – 
in addition to the underlying trends due to growth – is a major source of perturbations arising 
from the random fluctuations in prices or values that are caused by the anticipations made by 
the agents. Consequently we need to understand the additional effects that randomness 
superimposes on arguments based on the finiteness of the world and its flows of energy. 
I intend to conduct this discussion without technicalities since they only obscure the 
issues. However, while I have tried to limit the mathematical background required from the 
reader, I cannot avoid assuming a certain level of knowledge, since the concepts arise from that 
subject. 
We begin by reviewing the analysis of the Club of Rome to provide the context for our 
main discussion. 
 
I. On the Rome report: simple models and their refinements 
The issue of perfecting models is a classic trap. On the one hand, simple models have the 
disadvantage of being far from the laws of physics, biology and economics, but the advantage 
of being easy to calibrate. On the other hand, complex models seem to better reflect our 
knowledge of the phenomena being studied, but they have so many parameters that it becomes 
impossible to fine-tune them properly. Furthermore, their perfectionism gives an illusion of 
completeness: one can never be sure that they have taken everything into account. Ultimately, 
the most appropriate choice of model depends on the social use to which the model is being put, 
the sort of knowledge available, and the possible actions that can be taken
1
. The case of the 
Club of Rome is here typically a global reference, something for ―everyone‖. 
 
The philosophical value of the work of the Club of Rome. 
After the appearance of the first version of the report
 
[Meadows et al. 1972] numerous critics 
highlighted various weaknesses in the style of reasoning it used. Firstly, it was too simplistic: 
how could the reality of the world be captured in an algorithm whose equations comprise 
merely a few hundred lines of code? Next, and above all, it was closed: it could not take into 
account innovation, progress arising from science or technology or, more generally, human 
creativity. All of this may change completely, even the meaning of the words used in the model, 
yet the projections are based only on current knowledge. For example, concerning nuclear 
power, it only takes into account the nuclear fuel resources, the difficulty of storing waste and 
the problem of areas rendered uninhabitable by accidents. It does not consider the success of 
fusion technology whose advantages and disadvantages are still not well understood
2
. 
                                                        
1
 Cf. [Bouleau, 1999] Partie III. 
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 Cf. the discussions about the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project. 
The new version of the report, published 30 years later [Meadows et al., 2008] argued 
that the first version had not been contradicted by subsequent facts
 
[Turner, 2008], and 
maintained, in the new model World3-03, the same methodological principles. Balance sheets 
drawn up by the Meadows team are relatively independent of subjective economic 
interpretations because they are based on measurements of quantities: energy received from the 
sun, quantity of arable land, population etc, which allows the authors to express themselves in 
terms of specific indicators: ―human welfare‖ and ―ecological footprint‖. Several scenarios are 
studied under different assumptions of economic policies. The general conclusion is well 
known: unless politicians are very vigilant, we will always get an ―overshoot-collapse‖ 
situation, i.e., excessive growth followed by collapse. 
The truth value of this report does not lie in the details but in the thesis – which offends 
most philosophies and many religious beliefs – that one may take seriously and scientifically 
the fact that the finiteness of the world and its resources means radical changes are required to 
prevent collapse. This is a change of scene from that in which economics and politics usually 
take place, and can be seen as a turning point for civilization. It allows us to see that many old 
ideas about progress are based only on a desire for instant power without taking into account the 
limits, which is then turned into a rational theory. At this level, obviously only a simple line of 
argument can persuade. 
 
The power of simplicity applies to all models where there are conflicting interests. 
Let us now consider climate change and the IPCC with its three groups studying the physical 
phenomenon, the impact and politics of reduction and adaptation, and economic models for 
mitigation. Although the work of the third group is a priori the most delicate and the furthest 
from the objectivity of the natural sciences, it is the conclusions of the first group about human 
responsibility for climate change that have been attacked by climate skeptics. There remains an 
on-going conflict between the wider scientific community and protestors who claim to be 
adhering to scientific principles in challenging the hypothesis that the increase in greenhouse 
gases is due to human activity. 
Human responsibility cannot be proven with absolute certainty because one cannot state 
with mathematical precision what would have happened without human intervention. What the 
IPCC says goes against the economic interests of energy consumers. This case is 
epistemologically delicate and has shaken several recent philosophical doctrines. The 20
th
 
century has emphasized the links between knowledge and interest, already highlighted by 
Nietzsche, reworked by Habermas
3
 on the one hand and by Feyerabend
4
 on the other. A new 
conception of knowledge has now emerged, one that is definitely non-positivist, in which 
reality does not speak without being questioned and where the communities of researchers 
(Thomas Kuhn) and interest groups (Callon) are the ones who construct the concerns, 
representations and, ultimately, reality. Also the popularity of Science Studies (Latour, Callon, 
etc.) and its link with the mainstream of pragmatism that one can trace through Bentham, Mill, 
Bain, Dewey, Peirce, William James and Rorty, suggest that knowledge is a social construct 
and draws its relevance from social issues. The confrontation with the universalist and quasi-
positivist collective discourse of the IPCC is not simple.  Many texts of the new trends suggest 
– or at least do not rule out the idea – that economic negotiation is ultimately the key to the 
most positive patterns of behavior, i.e., those which are most efficient, persuasive and peaceful. 
Yet, even without absolute proof, reason affirms the human responsibility claimed by 
the IPCC, even though this clashes with and opposes economic logic. Why? Is it because of the 
seriousness of the work by various teams around the world, based on different models? Is it 
because of the fact that among those who have contributed to the work there are many 
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 J. Habermas Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968). 
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 P. Feyerabend Dialogues sur la connaissance (1991), Seuil, coll. "Science ouverte", 1998. 
researchers based in rich countries whose interests are not well served by raising these issues 
and that many leading climate skeptics are linked to powerful economic interests? It certainly is 
not an argument of authority (the number of renowned scientists or the prestige that some of 
them have) or a return to a positivist view of truth. But the relativism of knowledge – which 
relates to the issues discussed – seems too subtle a concern, a second-order effect. Ultimately, 
what is most important is the simplicity of the argument: On the one hand, the graph of CO2 
emissions as a function of time, on a historic scale, with its clear sign of the post-industrial 
period, combined with the physical fact of the effect of CO2 on the absorption of different 
wavelengths and, on the other hand, the graph of lower-atmosphere temperatures, with its step-
change in order of magnitude just after the industrial age. 
 
It is a mistake to complicate models of the environment. 
Excess mathematization is a natural path in the academic world, as a result of numerous 
institutional factors
5
. It is the most convenient way, in the academic world, of avoiding any 
commitment. One speaks of self-organization, of complex systems that are sensitive to initial 
conditions and, by talking of multi-agent models and other possible thesis topics
6
 … the ethical 
conclusion gradually, without anyone noticing, evolves into the belief that it is only scientific 
research that needs to be perfected. The productivism and selfishness of the privileged classes 
are forgotten. The economy is hit hard by this tendency. 
 
Keeping the simplicity of the Club of Rome’s arguments while reasoning probabilistically.  
In the most recent version, the Meadows team considered several different scenarios (11 
scenarios are discussed). In some ways this already represents the start of a probabilistic line of 
reasoning, but without considering the consequences of stochastics on current dynamics. 
In these scenarios we find the general idea of an evolution first in exponential growth 
(30 pages in Chapter 2) which, after a certain time, becomes tempered by constraints arising 
from limits in material and energy in the planet (80 pages in Chapter 3). What happens after the 
peak is only sketched, the authors emphasizing that this time of decline causes social changes so 
great that they cannot be modeled sensibly. Simplifying to dimension 1, one could say that there 
is a logistic equation, more or less refined, that leads to certain horizontal asymptotes for the 
combined balance sheets of minerals and fossils, and certain bell curves, with a peak and then a 
decline, for the marginal trends and quantities, i.e., for the derivatives. 
Our plan will naturally be the following: first we describe the new features of stochastic 
processes with regard to deterministic trends (part II), and then we review the consequences of 
uncertainty for the vulnerability of the environment subject to economic rationale (part III) and 
we conclude by highlighting the most important points. 
 
II. Qualitative aspects of stochastic processes 
While a deterministic quantity is completely described by the evolution of a number as a 
function of time, a stochastic process is, in some way, a piece of music for multiple voices. 
 
Probabilistic “reasoning”. 
For all evolutions (growth, decline, convergence) we should specify whether we are arguing in 
distribution, in mean or path-by-path. 
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 I’ve gone into this in more detail elsewhere: on the philosophical level cf ―On Excessive Mathematization, 
Symptoms, Diagnosis and Philosophical bases for Real World Knowledge ‖ Real World Economics 57, 6 
September 2011, 90-105 (http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/) and on the financial level "Mathématiques et 
autoréférence des marchés" (http://cermics.enpc.fr/~bouleaun/publications.htm). 
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 In this way one talks of "complex adaptative systems", "critically self-organized" systems, the "agent-based" or 
"self-generated" complexity, or of "highly optimized tolerance" etc. cf for example [Rosser, 1999], [Harris, 2007]. 
 Arguments "in distribution" or "in the mean" (quadratic mean, or in spaces of summable 
p-th power), also arguments "in probability" introduce compensations that probabilistic calculus 
allows between the events where there is an increase and those where there is decrease. The 
evolutions thus described are in general fairly regular because the causes that attribute certain 
probabilities to certain phenomena usually have some degree of permanence. 
 But we are also interested in what happens for each trajectory that chance produces, 
because it is one of these trajectories that describes what actually occurs, or at least what the 
model suggests will occur. And the most fundamental information that the study of stochastic 
processes has given is that the behavior of trajectories can be very different from that which 
dynamics depicts from distributions or mean. 
 
Trajectories in stochastic processes are erratic, often very erratic. 
There are stochastic processes that are smooth, but only where chance applies to only the 
derivatives or higher derivatives of the quantity. In general stochastic processes are very 
irregular. A good image is given by share prices, or the silhouette of a mountain crag. 
 What happens in financial markets – forgetting for the moment the economic role of 
these institutions – is interesting because it shows how uncertainty, and the imperfect 
knowledge that agents have of the future, result in the frantic movement of the quantity on 
which they act. Where the evolution of a currency or an action is not certain – and thus 
financiers do not agree on the likely outcome – the quantity will not take a medial path that 
would represent some sort of averaging of the opinions. Instead it will become erratic, and 
much more erratic when the uncertainty is large. This wildness, which financiers call volatility, 
is considered to be the most objective measure of the uncertainty affecting the economic 
quantities being studied [Bouleau, 2004]. 
 In other words, in general, a stochastic process doesn't possess any clear trend (no speed 
or derivative in the mathematical sense); from one moment to the next it will increase or 
decrease.  
 
figure 1 
 
 
Phenomenology of the exponential family. 
 The heart of the argument of the Club of Rome is to consider phenomena with relatively 
constant growth rates and to show that, sooner or later, they ―go to the wall‖. These are 
quantities whose rate of change is proportional to their actual value, with a positive coefficient. 
In the case of many variables these can be put in a matrix calculus and the signs of the 
eigenvalues indicate which linear combinations of variables will vanish and which will increase 
explosively. This exponential growth cannot last and will necessarily by interrupted by some 
phenomenon whose role as a brake will increase progressively. Hence the appearance of an 
additional term in the equation which leads, in the simplest case, to a logistic equation or 
similar, and results in a saturation and, for the Club of Rome models, to a collapse. 
 One fundamental phenomenological point is that this is completely different in the case 
where the quantity has a random element to it. If a quantity showing an exponential character is 
subject to some randomness that is constant proportionally to the quantity’s size, then one of 
two things will happen. If the randomness is small, the general path of the trajectory will be as 
one would expect: an exponential curve with fluctuations, above and below, that gradually 
become larger; this case is illustrated by figure 2. But if the randomness exceeds a certain 
threshold (as often occurs in financial markets, for example) the behavior of the paths will be 
completely different from what our intuition suggests: they all end, after some oscillations, by 
tending to zero; this case is illustrated by figure 3. 
 This phenomenon is well known in the case of martingales, which are processes in 
which the mathematical expectation is constant
7
. There exist positive martingales for which all 
trajectories tend to zero (figure 5). In this case the study of phenomena "in distribution" or "in 
the mean‖ do not at all match what happens in reality. And this is not just some sort of 
mathematical pathology; such cases are extremely common, particularly in economics.  
 
 
     
 
 For example, if you put your money in a fund that pays 4.5% and you reinvest your 
dividends constantly, you will achieve exponential growth. If, however, there is some 
uncertainty which increases the volatility, and this volatility exceeds 3%, the oscillations are 
such that one will frequently approach very small values, and in the long run you are certain to 
be ruined. 
 As another example, if you put your money in at 10% and each year you gamble half 
your money, the cumulative effect of the gain and the uncertainty will lead you inevitably to 
ruin. The positive martingales which tend towards zero are typical in fair games and have major 
significance in terms of collapse.  
 The same remarks obviously also apply if we consider situations where there is some 
limit on the exponential dynamic which causes some braking, leading to an equation of the 
logistic type, with a bell curve instead of something that increases indefinitely. 
 The most important philosophical point of this phenomenology is that in the case where 
there is randomness, and it exceeds the threshold we discussed, it is impossible to tell from the 
trajectory what would have happened without that randomness
8
. In other words, exponential 
behavior cannot be detected in what is objectively observable. Thus an observation such as 
figure 1 does not allow us to infer an underlying exponential dynamic. 
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 Figure 4 is how one intuitively expects a martingale to behave. It’s the special case of a ―uniformly integrable‖ 
martingale. 
8
 The general question of knowing if one can understand the deterministic trends underlying a stochastic process 
has been written about at length. The negative response is a consequence of the theorem attributed to Girsanov, cf. 
[Bouleau, 2004] p37., and for a precise mathematical formulation cf. [Lamberton et al., 2008]. 
 Stationarity does not mean “always the same”. 
A somewhat similar remark needs to be made about stationary processes. In most cases, and 
especially in the normal (Gaussian) case, they exceed, after a certain period of time, all levels 
given in advance
9. Thus a situation which appears to be ―sustainable‖ when considered ―in 
distribution‖ may turn out not to be so for every trajectory. This is because the size is 
unbounded (its marginal distribution has no compact support) and that chance makes it ―walk‖ 
everywhere.  
One would think, then, that this phenomenon cannot occur in a finite world. However, 
we will see later that economic logic requires us to consider that prices are unbounded. 
 
In an uncertain world there are rare events, and their probability is generally unknown. 
We now turn to issues that are less descriptive, and more semantic in nature.  
If knowledge comes from statistics obtained from experiments, then distribution tails are 
poorly known; this is obvious and frequently noted. If the quantity represents a level (of water, 
or of temperature, etc.) then extreme events are badly probabilized. 
 But we must go further than this. We must consider the role played by meaning in the 
concept of rarity; this is linked to the unprobabilizable uncertainty that was so dear to Keynes. 
What does it mean to talk of a ―rare event‖? An event is simply a (Borel) subset of the real 
numbers. Events whose description is complicated generally have a poorly understood 
probability, for the same reasons as those related to extreme events. And the central 
philosophical point is that our interest (in the most general sense of that which attracts our 
attention) is governed by the meaning of the event, i.e., by the impact of this event on the rest of 
the world. This impact is not in the model studied but in, precisely, that which is not modeled. 
Translating this concern into the probabilistic language of models is a difficult operation that 
usually we do not know how to achieve. 
 To precisely describe the mathematical form of events that we fear is particularly 
difficult for a stochastic process. An event is a region in path-space. Why talk of this one or that 
one? One speaks of those which are interesting, those that mean something in terms of 
consequences for what matters to us, on the economy or on the environment. But the interest 
that we bring to such and such phenomenon is not at all objective and is usually highly 
subjective. That is why the forms of families of temporal trajectories that have some meaning, 
that can be interpreted, generally have poorly understood probabilities, because the rarity 
ascribed to them is usually subjective, at least in part. It is linked to the fact that the event 
matters to us, or to others.  
 Let’s clarify this tricky but important point. How does an event, which is perceived as 
rare by some people but not by others, come to have a poorly understood probability? The 
model is a summary and we extrapolate from it by different interpretations. The model’s output 
is accurate about the things that are common to all these various interpretations, because the 
model only ―speaks‖ clearly about this common ground. Except for some purely physical 
phenomena (emission of alpha particles, Brownian motion, etc.), for most of the interesting 
situations that we are concerned with (in the environment, in economics, etc.) the element of 
chance in probabilistic models is a way of representing our ignorance, some sort of convention 
that we stop at a set of facts and interpretations, and we do not go beyond this point, because 
that is where opinions start to diverge
10
. 
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 This is true even for processes that are strictly stationary, i.e. when their marginal distributions of order n are 
invariant under translation. 
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 One can read more about this in my book Risk and Meaning, Adversaries in Art, Science and Philosophy, 
(Springer 2011), especially chapters II (Cournot's "Philosophical Probabilities") and XI (Jacques Monod's 
Roulette). 
 III. Vulnerability of the environment when subject to economic “rationality” 
Does this collection of striking features of the phenomenology of random processes have any 
consequences for our understanding of the work of the Club of Rome and, more generally, the 
question of the limits to growth? 
 The first issue is to determine whether or not there is randomness and, if there is, what 
creates it. 
 
It is the economy that adds randomness. 
All rated quantities – raw materials and prized materials, sources of energy, lands and real estate 
– all fluctuate in our liberal economy. We will go deeper into the reasons for this in a moment. 
But let’s note already that to reason as the Meadows team did, without using monetary value, is 
to build a model that is disconnected from the forces that represent the interests of agents (or at 
least from those forces that the agents believe represent their interests). The key fact that the 
economy exists – particularly in the globalized neoliberal period we find ourselves in – means 
that the link between an economic interpretation of the world, which is very random, and the 
deterministic curves of the Meadows report, is not made. 
 
The mechanism for finding a market price necessarily involves randomness. 
We can first ask whether price formation in markets is truly stochastic in nature, or whether it is 
governed by some complex, chaotic mechanism. The question might be interesting to the 
quants on the trading floors, but for our purposes it is not very important. Both representations 
are simply models. What matters is that it moves and that one cannot tell in advance how it will 
evolve. 
 In organized markets, for a price to be established, market makers or an exchange 
systems must work constantly to produce the current spot price. Indeed, if the dealers are split 
into two groups: the bulls who think it will rise and that the current price is too low, and the 
bears who think the opposite, what will happen to the price if the bulls buy? The price will rise. 
And if we let the bears sell, then the price will fall. The organization providing the spot price 
will therefore sometimes let one group speak, and sometimes the other, so that both camps 
always have some members. Technically it will seek to maintain good liquidity, i.e., to 
minimize the bid-ask discrepancy (for details of how markets function, cf. for example [Cont et 
al., 2010]). 
 Thus we understand that when we say that volatility is the uncertainty in the evolution 
of the price of the quantity, we may as well say that this irregularity reflects the difficulty that 
the trading organization has in achieving the balance between buyers and sellers needed to 
maintain the permanence of the pricing. 
 
The price of a scarce commodity does not follow the logistic curve of the Club of Rome; it 
follows a “punk hairstyle” instead 
We’ll now look at things in more detail. If we take the price of copper, or the price of teak, the 
primary characteristic of the trajectory over time is that it is jagged, and that no-one can say 
with any certainty whether it is about to go up or to go down, let alone predict its value in a 
year’s time. 
 The best example is the price of fossil-fuel energy resources. Neo-classical economists 
in the nineteenth century proposed deterministic models. The best-known examples of this type 
of thinking are the Hotelling model and its improvements. Without going into detail about the 
equations, a model that takes account of randomness will give a price graph similar to figure 3. 
We note that the prospect of depleted resources, combined with the fact that dealers use their 
arsenal of futures products on the derivatives markets to anticipate future prices, render these 
models meaningless unless they incorporate a significant random component. Without that, 
expectations would make the price explode. For this not to happen, it is essential that the agents 
believe that there is a positive probability that the price may go down again. And this can only 
happen if the prices are randomly excited. This is what happens in financial markets for most 
quantities, for similar reasons. We can even understand that this is not just a little bit of 
randomness – a light breeze that gently shakes things – but rather it is a massive disturbance 
that will completely obliterate the underlying deterministic curve. This reinforces the need to 
reason as if we do not have any idea at all when the ―peak oil‖ will occur [Helm, 2011]. 
 
The “price signal” of exhaustible resources works very poorly. 
The consequence of this is that the ―wise response‖ to the depletion of resources, that of raising 
prices so as to encourage agents to develop alternative energy sources and substitutes for the 
missing minerals, will not occur spontaneously, purely as a result of the price, because there is 
too much variation in the price signal
11
. The fall in the price of an energy resource, from a very 
high price to a low price, will kill the long-term investment in new technologies. 
 Indeed, it is clear that the magnitude of the financial uncertainties that we face prevents 
us from taking new directions. Using the IPCC estimates, for a stabilization target of 550ppm
12
 
CO2 equivalent, the marginal cost reduction in 2030 would be between $5 and $80 per ton, i.e., 
a spread of 1 to 16. In these conditions, a businessman interested in the carbon emissions of his 
enterprise must evaluate investments whose profitability, even with some subsidies, is 
extremely uncertain, when compared with the long-term interest rate that the financial markets 
can provide today. Instead of stepping out and being the first among its competitors to begin 
this adventure, the business is almost obliged to wait until that spread is reduced. 
 This also explains why a system of tradable rights, as in Europe, or a tax on petroleum 
products, can only be effective at creating decarbonization and energy-efficiency technologies if 
it leads to the publication of a quasi-deterministic forecast of how the price will vary over a 
sufficiently long period
13
. 
 
Local agricultural methods are disrupted and driven to destructive practices. 
In agriculture and livestock, in addition to meteorological variations, globalization has added 
significant randomness to prices [Daviron et al., 2011] which, since the winner takes all, ends 
up destroying traditional, sustainable practices and encouraging methods that are destructive 
and short-sighted. These survival techniques may also draw on ancient agricultural and farming 
customs but these are then carried out using the available mechanized technologies (burning of 
forests, fishing and hunting endangered species)
 14
. 
 
The economic valuation of non-marketable common goods will relentlessly erode them. 
A major consequence of the random nature of economic prices is that all the theoretical logic of 
cost-benefit analysis is lost, when applied to the environment. 
 To preserve the environment, economists usually say we must give a value to its 
preservation, i.e., put a price on it. This presents various kinds of difficulties, technical, political 
or legal. On a purely technical level, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) gives a price to non-
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 A study [Boyce 2011] about petrol, carbon, and 78 minerals, showed no correlation between the variation in the 
price and the variation in the quantity extracted. The impact of the variation in the price of petrol on the economy is 
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 On the complex interplay of interractions, cf. [Warren 2011]. Furthermore, being unable to occupy space with 
sustainable activities, poor regions are also led to accept poorly-recycled waste from countries that are more 
technologically advanced. 
marketable goods in such a way as to be comparable with marketable goods
15
. CBA methods 
are usually explained in textbooks
16
, so we will not go into detail here.  However it is done, 
cost-benefit analysis can only determine a price based on information from the past and the 
present. Yet prices fluctuate. There will necessarily come a time when randomness in the 
evolution of prices will mean that the service provided by the collective good will be valued 
lower than the substitute marketable goods that it could be replaced by. Certainly we can see 
that preserving the environment is of growing importance in public opinion and in this regard, a 
proper CBA needs to be updated to take this into account. But this concerns non-marketable 
goods – by definition, there is nothing to sell. The price estimate of the ecological service is 
inevitably calm and quasi-deterministic. It can only follow a smooth curve (a convolution) and 
thus a time will come, sooner or later, when the service provided by artificial means will be 
cheaper. 
 This is particularly serious for biodiversity. A typical approach employed by free-market 
economists is to divide species into two categories
17
. On the one hand there is the remarkable 
biodiversity, comprising those species considered by various ad hoc bodies to be threatened. 
For them we calculate the cost of maintaining them as we would for, say, a historic building. On 
the other hand, for ordinary biodiversity, i.e., all other species, we calculate their value by the 
ecological service they provide, from prokaryotes (bacteria) to eukaryotes (higher species) 
using standard methods of cost-benefit analysis. We can then buy and sell every part of nature 
or exchange against goods or services already quantified economically. 
 It is clear that on each specific question, on the way to preserve such and such species in 
its current condition, the fluctuations in cost legitimize artificial substitutions and the 
irreversible destruction of habitats. Consider a specific marshy wetland area that is in 
destructive competition with a deposit of fossil fuels. The two rarities do not evolve in the same 
way. On the one side there are real and random fluctuations in the price of fossil energy (due to 
speculation) and on the other there are gradual adjustments in the calculation of ―ecological 
services‖. The fuel deposit will, some day, end up priced above the carefully calculated 
estimates for the marsh. For the environment, this method is the bulldozer of substitutability. 
 
Taking economic value as a moral compass when faced with uncertainty is to play roulette with 
the environment, and will lead, sooner or later, to ruin. 
Market value is still considered, not only by mainstream economists but also by policy makers, 
as a reflection of what people are willing to concede for the use of goods, after taking account 
of personal criteria and the collective game of social exchange. In the background is a picture of 
a harmonious world, in an equilibrium that slowly evolves with improvements in business 
performance and changes in consumer tastes. This image is a legacy of the neoclassical thinking 
of Léon Walras and others of the 19
th
 century, who saw the economy in terms inspired by the 
minimal action principle in mechanics, and who described equilibrium states by mathematical 
methods of optimization. It is completely superceded by current practices which, while still 
relying on that philosophy, have great difficulty in thinking of economics without growth 
[Jackson, 2009], particularly in the case of the credit and securities market and because of the 
―debt-based monetary system‖ [Sorrel, 2010]. 
 But in addition to this, prices fluctuate. In these conditions the competition between a 
non-marketable good and a commercial commodity is not equal. Under the blows of the waves, 
even large fragments of a cliff can fall into the sea, but they do not rise again when the sea is 
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1992] and [Ackerman et al. 2002]. But the point made here is, in our opinion, even more serious. 
16 For these methods, without any critical discussion, see [Pearce et al. 2006]. 
17
 Cf for example in France "Approche économique de la biodiversité et des services liés aux écosystèmes, 
Contribution à la décision publique", Centre d'Analyse Stratégique April 2009. 
calm
18
. The key point here is that in the long term the present economic organization, with its 
financial markets that govern the most important prices, is incapable of setting limits to prices 
that fluctuate. In other words, the whole world is finite and bounded, except for prices. 
 
From quoted prices in financial markets to prices in everyday life. 
We first make a remark that complements the arguments above. Stock prices, currency rates and 
commodity prices fluctuate in financial markets, as we have said. But the way the economy 
works in society in reality means there are certain ―valves‖ which ensure that certain quantities 
stay stable or grow randomly, but never go down. This is generally true of real estate prices in 
city centers in Europe, and of salary levels for certain professions, etc. Without going into the 
mathematical details, the reader will understand that the existence of steps and rises creates a 
situation that is random and unpredictable, whose consequences are similar to those of a process 
which rises and falls, in so far as we never know how much it will increase in a given time 
period
19
. 
 It thus appears that the primary source of turbulence that spreads through the economy 
comes from the financial markets
20
. This leads us to the conclusion that this turbulence, which 
has such devastating effects where the economy and the environment meet, is there to allow 
financial markets to exist. Given that, should we conclude that we should get rid of them? Yes, 
so long as we measure how much this idea necessarily disrupts free trade from top to bottom. 
Because even if capital markets are the principal source of randomness, they are not the only 
ones (there is also randomness in business, in transport, in economic policy decisions, etc.). 
Until we know how to think, globally and in the details, about a sustainable economics that does 
not unduly restrict our customary freedom, in which the evolution of prices over time is smooth, 
it is essential to regulate and vigilantly resist the attacks of randomness that come from 
economic logic. 
 
Conclusion 
Randomness hides trends. It is precisely for this reason that there is randomness in financial 
markets. For if the trends were clear, they would be immediately exploited, and their clarity 
would disappear. In hiding these trends, randomness weakens the arguments that one can derive 
from the finiteness of the world and its limits. This is one reason why the warnings given by the 
Club of Rome were not acted upon: bell curves – quasi-exponential growth, overshoot, peak, 
decay and collapse – we do not see these in prices. We genuinely feel, when watching 
commodity and share prices, that the economy is still broadly in the same situation. So long as 
agents’ behavior is governed by the economic climate rather than by moral considerations, 
business as usual will continue. 
 For the ancient Greeks, chance was on the side of nature; they feared the wrath of 
Poseidon so much that they were ready to sacrifice a young girl. Until the 18
th
 century it was the 
―elements‖ that were random; humans actually occupied only a tiny part of the planet. Now the 
situation has changed: a great disaster, such as the Tōhoku tsunami, may kill 20,000, i.e., three 
millionths of the world population, yet this is far lower than the number who die in car 
accidents each year. Humans occupy the majority of the planet and it is they, by economic 
reasoning and free-market logic, that is the main source of randomness. The economy is now the 
                                                        
18
 Recent examples include the exploitation of oil sands in Canada, coal in Australia, and the Belo Monte dam 
which has just been signed off by the president of Brazil, and which will flood 400,000 hectares of forest, and 
displace 40,000 inhabitants. 
19
 One way to understand such reasoning, often used by economic correspondents in the media, is to consider the 
graph of relative changes, where the randomness of the increases is more obvious. 
20
 Specifically, the turbulence comes from the fact that if a market shows a clear trend that sets it apart from a risk-
free investment, then it is unstable,  since buying and selling will, respectively, cause the price to increase or 
decrease. 
environment that the environment finds itself in. Neoliberalism has become the storm, against 
which the world needs protection. That clearly means that it is not enough to relay information 
about the current and future physical states of the world; this will not convince an economic 
agent who sees prices fluctuate. It is essential to attack the problem at its root, which is the way 
that the market economy ―speaks‖ by imposing a screen of volatility over the determinism of 
the collapse. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A) On the origin of the volatility of market prices. 
 Robert J. Schiller begins his 450-page book Market Volatility [Schiller, 1989] with the 
phrase ―The origin of price movements are poorly known in all speculative markets for 
corporate stocks, bonds, homes, land, commercial structures, commodities, collectibles and 
foreign exchange‖. 
 In its simplest version, finance theory says that an asset cannot have a foreseeable 
evolution unless it is deterministic and varies as the core investment, without any risk: the 
―bond‖. It also says that under certain hypotheses, often framed in terms of perfect information 
– although the notion of information is simple to express mathematically, but not at all simple 
in what it represents – the uncertain assets are martingales, i.e., processes which have the 
―centre of gravity property‖ [Bouleau, 2004]. We know mathematically that these processes are 
very irregular. Thus we have a theory that explains the irregularities we see in stock prices. But 
this is not the real explanation of the behavior, of course, because markets usually function with 
only incomplete, partial information. 
 All studies conclude that there are two types of reason. On the one hand, the effect of 
real shocks that change the landscape of the activity: technological innovation, consumer tastes, 
social or political change, fundamental changes in currency rates, etc. On the other hand, there 
are psychological factors arising from differing opinions, changes in confidence, differing levels 
of risk-aversion, etc. 
 In this article we have outlined a simplified form of the non-arbitrage principle: the 
value of an asset cannot be predicted if its evolution is different from a bond, because if not, 
then it would enable risk-free profits and this would change its value. This argument does not 
explain the phenomenon beyond saying that the variation in the price of an asset (its volatility) 
is even larger when the evolution of the asset is more uncertain. 
 To discuss this latter phenomenon would require a definition of uncertainty different 
from that given by volatility. This is a genuine research program with a high risk of subjective 
interpretations. We are therefore reduced to recording that volatility is, often (for instance for 
currencies), lower in the more highly diversified and highly structured economies of advanced 
countries, and greater concerning the assets of developing countries where there is more 
uncertainty about the future. 
 
B) We choose two graphs from among the many possible, to serve as a visual aid to 
complement this article. 
 
 
 
 
C) If one compares the above reflections on the compulsory agitation of markets to recent 
events concerning political strategies on the environment such as the strength of the climate-
skeptic current, one might legitimately ask whether there would be some structural economic 
link, by the mere incentives of liberalism, that push to contradict even the most scientific 
predictions, see [Michaels 2008] [Oreskes et al. 2010]. 
I do not currently have the sociological analyses that would bring the facts about it in Europe 
or the U.S., it's why I leave this comment out text in the appendix as a hypothesis. 
This hypothesis would give a stronger meaning to the term "merchants" in the title of Naomi 
Oreskes' book since we would then talk about "market doubts." 
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